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With the expansion of natural resource-based economies in
Latin America, extraterritorial actors 1 have come to exercise
increasing inﬂuence over the economic, social, and political
dynamics of the rural territories in which they operate. While
such actors have a long history in Latin America (sometimes
dating to pre-colonial times), their number has increased over
the last two decades as the combined eﬀect of increased global
demand for diﬀerent natural resources, natural resource com-
panies’ eﬀorts to identify new sources of supply and, above all,
policy reforms promoting external investment in the primary
sector and supported by dominant social coalitions that typi-
cally involve the central government, fractions of national
elites, and interests linked to transnational investment
(Gudynas, 2012; Kaup, 2013). This pattern is perhaps espe-
cially apparent for the case of mining and hydrocarbons but
is also evident in the agroindustrial, bioenergy, hydroelectric,
tourism, and forestry sectors (Bebbington & Bury, 2013;
Borras, Franco, Gomez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012; Martı´nez-
Alier, Kallis, Veuthey, Walter, & Temper, 2010; Muradian,
Walter, & Martı´nez-Alier, 2012). The presence of these extra-
territorial actors has catalyzed economic growth, introduced
acute asymmetries of power within territories and exerted
new pressures on environmental assets. 2
These investments from extraterritorial sources and the
transformations that they produce in rural territories go hand
in hand with changes in environmental regulatory institutions.
Typically, the institutional changes that occur earlier in these
processes seek to facilitate and initiate new investment through
the reform of laws that regulate the access to natural assets.
Sometimes, the subsequent environmental and social impacts
of these investments then induce various groups of actors to
seek a stricter regulation of the activities undertaken by extra-
territorial actors. This paper analyzes the process of institu-
tional change when extraterritorial actors are already
installed, have transformed economic dynamics, and have
introduced new power relationships in the territory. In this32context, we ask: (i) under what conditions might environmen-
tal institutions emerge that promote the protection of a terri-
tory’s environmental assets; and (ii) what types of
environmental institutions might be expected under those con-
ditions? Asking these questions seems generally important,
given the challenge of environmental stewardship under condi-
tions of rapidly increased investment in natural resource
industries in Latin America. The questions are also important
within the context of the larger program of Latin American
research of which this paper is a part (see Berdegue´ et al.,
2012 and Berdegue´, Bebbington & Escobal, 2015): in that pro-
gram, a detailed analysis of 20 diﬀerent territories failed to
identify a single territory where dynamics of change could
clearly and deﬁnitely be considered environmentally sustain-
able. Indeed, the program’s researchers spoke of an “environ-
mental paradox” to indicate that environmental crises were
seen in all types of socioeconomic dynamics, regardless of
whether poverty was reduced or income distribution improved
(Berdegue´ et al., 2012).
The available literature on political ecology and environ-
mental governance (see, for example, Bebbington, 2012;
Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006;
Perreault, 2013) suggests that when powerful extractive or
agroindustrial activities are present, institutional changes to
reduce environmental pressures are diﬃcult to achieve
(Kirsch, 2012), and do not necessarily eliminate the conﬂict
that these activities create (Arellano-Yanguas, 2012). In
exploring the conditions under which such changes might
occur, this paper suggests that it is important to distinguish
between institutions that regulate access to, and institutions
that regulate management of, the territory’s natural resources.
Typically, the state is proactive in creating institutions that
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slower to fashion institutions that regulate how resources are
managed by these investors. Furthermore the prior creation
of institutions of access complicates possibilities for building
institutions of environmental management. This study identi-
ﬁes two dimensions to the processes through which new insti-
tutions of environmental management might emerge: (i) the
ﬁrst dimension involves structural pressures on natural
resources, pressures that derive in large measure due to the
logics of capital accumulation as explored by ecological Marx-
ism (O’Connor, 2001); (ii) the second dimension is one of col-
lective action, either in the form of collective eﬀorts of resource
users to address acute environmental problems (the sort of col-
lective action addressed by Ostrom, 1990, and others) or in the
form of social mobilization and protest (as addressed by social
movement scholars and political ecologists, e.g., Dubet, 1989;
McAdam, 1982; Peet & Watts, 2004; Tarrow, 1983; Tilly,
1978; Touraine, 1978). 3
Finally, we show why, even in the presence of structural
pressures on the environment, management institutions might
not emerge. First, the power asymmetries in the territory that
are introduced by extraterritorial actors and dominant coali-
tions limit potential reforms to institutions that involve the
management of environmental assets. In other words, extra-
territorial actors might be willing to change technologies,
introduce forms of monitoring, and oﬀer some compensation
for negative externalities in their projects, but will resist
change in the rules that determine access to and use of natural
resources. Second, the degree of inclusion of local actors in the
new territorial dynamics catalyzed by investment in natural
resource economies is crucial for determining their behavior
with regard to extraterritorial agents and their investments.
The greater the inclusion, the more concerns about natural
assets are dissipated and the less likely it is that a process of
mobilization against activities by extraterritorial actors will
develop. Third, competition among resource users, and the
fact that they experience the adverse eﬀects of resource degra-
dation at diﬀerent times, limits the possibility that they will act
collectively to address this degradation.
The empirical data for this paper were gathered in two
phases. In the ﬁrst phase, twenty territories were studied in
depth, over an approximately year-long period and using a
combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. Each
of these territories had been previously identiﬁed (on the
basis of census and household survey data) as demonstrating
progress against indicators of poverty, inequality and growth,
and the in-depth studies sought to explain the drivers of
these trends and (in most instances) identify the environmen-
tal changes that had accompanied them. In the second phase,
a further round of qualitative research was undertaken in
those territories whose dynamics of change had been charac-
terized by (i) signiﬁcant economic growth and (ii) the pres-
ence of powerful extraterritorial actors whose productive
activities were based on natural resources. These three terri-
tories, and their related economic transformations, were: sal-
mon farming in the Chiloe´ archipelago of Chile; fruit
cultivation in the Chilean Region of O’Higgins; and natural
gas production in the dry Chaco of the Department of Tari-
ja, Bolivia. 4 In each instance, data were collected regarding
the presence, activities, and environmental impact of these
extraterritorial actors, as well as about broader economic,
political and social processes, and patterns of environmental
governance. The information was derived mainly from ﬁeld
visits, interviews with key actors and informants in the
respective territories, and a review of the relevant national
and sub-national legislation.In the following section we give a brief overview of contem-
porary rural territorial dynamics in Latin America in the pres-
ence of powerful extraterritorial actors and introduce the three
case studies. The third section explains what we understand by
environmental institutions and why it is important to distin-
guish between institutions that regulate access and those that
regulate the management of environmental assets. The fourth
section analyzes the two dimensions to the pathways of insti-
tutional change that we found in our study: (i) structural pres-
sures that lead to an environmental crisis, and (ii) social
mobilization prior to environmental crises. In the concluding
section, we discuss why meaningful institutional changes in
the regulation of environmental assets are so diﬃcult to
achieve.2. TERRITORIAL DYNAMICS AND EXTERNAL
ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA
This paper is part of a broader research project (the Rural
Territorial Dynamics [RTD] Program) that analyzed how
some 10,000 municipalities in 11 Latin American countries
had performed over the past decade in terms of economic
growth, poverty, inequality, and environmental quality
(Berdegue´ et al., 2012; Berdegue´ et al., 2015). The program
found that approximately 10% of the region’s municipalities
had experienced growth combined with a reduction in poverty
and inequality. Such outcomes were rarely if ever experienced
in isolated territories poorly connected to national or global
society. Instead, this virtuous combination of the three eco-
nomic variables seems to depend on some sort of connection
with broader markets and the presence of “extraterritorial
actors,” in particular large scale enterprises and national gov-
ernments. Based on the program’s twenty case studies, 5 we
identify two broad ways in which such actors have catalyzed
growth. In the ﬁrst, extraterritorial actors control and make
direct use of the resources of a territory. In a case such as
the production and industrial commercialization of salmon
in Chiloe´ (Chile), or the extraction of natural gas in Tarija
(Bolivia), the characteristics of the resource imply scales of
operation, costs and information, capital and technology
needs that make it diﬃcult or impossible for local actors to
exploit the resource without outside participation. Under these
circumstances, extraterritorial actors’ access to the resource
becomes the principal driver of economic growth within the
territory. Typically in these cases, the actors that control the
drivers of territorial dynamics are large, private, and often
transnational companies that tend to enjoy political support
from the national government. The fact that these extraterrito-
rial companies are sometimes linked to small or mid-size local
companies (as is the case with salmon farming in Chiloe´) or
third-sector/non-proﬁt organizations does not substantially
weaken their dominant position within the territory. 6
In the second situation, extraterritorial actors help create the
initial conditions that give impetus to a territorial dynamic,
but the economic driver is controlled by local actors. In 14
of the 20 cases, we found that the outside actor’s intervention
consisted of creating assets such as infrastructure, establishing
links with markets, or providing training in key aspects that
facilitated the territory’s connection with other territories or
with extraterritorial markets. The conditions most frequently
modiﬁed by extraterritorial actors are road and communica-
tion infrastructure (which, in turn, create additional territorial
assets), without which access to important markets for local
products is impossible. In other territories, extraterritorial
actors themselves are crucial for ensuring access to more
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nizations that connect agroecological coﬀee producers in Loja,
Ecuador with organic coﬀee markets in Europe and the USA
(Ospina Peralta & Hollenstein, 2015). Similar scenarios are
found in dairy cooperatives in Santo Toma´s, Nicaragua,
which produce for international markets (Ravnborg &
Go´mez, 2015), or certiﬁcation of mezcal production in Oaxaca
(Mexico). In these cases, the connection established by extra-
territorial actors is not so much physical (roads and means
of communication) as social (mediation between territory
and markets). Figure 1 shows a schematic summary of the
two situations we identiﬁed.
In this paper we focus on three cases in which extraterrito-
rial actors wield control over the economic driver. While these
cases are a minority among the 20 territories studied in the
program, their importance resides in the fact that across the
region national governments have identiﬁed such large scale,
extraterritorial investment in and control over natural
resources as a strategy of local and national economic devel-
opment. The ﬁrst territory is the Chiloe´ archipelago in south-
ern Chile, which has been characterized by a dramatic boom
and bust in the salmon industry that displaced the centrality
traditional local economy based on small-scale farming, sheep
and small-scale ﬁshing. Since its beginnings, aquaculture was
strongly promoted by the national government and the salmon
companies. Nevertheless, this industrial-scale salmon produc-
tion was shaken in 2008 by an environmental and health crisis
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Figure 1. Scheme of types of interventions by extraterritorial actors on the
territorial dynamic.of which are still being felt. At the peak of the crisis, salmon
production came to a practical standstill, and there were mas-
sive layoﬀs on the islands. Despite this crisis – itself triggered
by damage to water resources that had been caused by the ﬁsh-
farming industry – the local population’s reaction regarding
care and protection of the environment has been muted.
Because the salmon industry has become their main source
of employment, local communities view it positively as a
source of jobs, rather than negatively as a cause of adverse
environmental transformation. In 2010, however, the Chilean
state developed new regulations which, though still not fully
implemented, seek to support the development of the industry
by improving sanitary controls and, therefore, the sustainabil-
ity of ﬁsh farming (Barton & Fløysandb, 2010; Bustos-
Gallardo, 2013; Mace´, Bornschlegl, & Paulson, 2010;
Mendoza & Ramı´rez, 2012; Nussbaum, Pavez & Ramı´rez,
2012; Ramı´rez, Modrego, Mace´, & Ya´n˜ez, 2009).
The second case is that of the Chaco of Tarija, Bolivia, with
an economy now based on the extraction of hydrocarbons,
mainly by the transnational companies operating now in coor-
dination with the state hydrocarbons company. Tarija is home
to one of South America’s largest onshore gas reserves, the
Campo Margarita, operated by the Spanish company Repsol
and lying beneath the Itika Guasu Community Land of Origin
(Tierra Comunitaria de Origen, TCO). This TCO belongs to
the Guaranı´ people, though is also occupied by non- Guaranı´
livestock owners. As in the case of salmon aquaculture in Chil-
oe´, natural gas extraction in Tarija has been promoted by both
the central government and transnational corporations, while
the state has played only a passive role in implementing and
enforcing environmental regulations. In this instance, how-
ever, the local population was more assertive and the Guaranı´
promoted important institutional changes. A “Friendship
Agreement” that Repsol committed to in 2010 included an
environmental audit, recognition of the right to prior consul-
tation and the Guaranı´ communities’ property rights, as well
as the creation of an investment fund for community develop-
ment (Anthias, 2012; Castro & Cortez, 2011; Hinojosa &
Hennermann, 2011; Humphreys Bebbington, 2010, 2013).
The interior drylands of Chile’s O’Higgins Region, our third
case, were characterized in the past by an economy based
mainly on extensive wheat farming. Land use gradually chan-
ged to support one of the country’s largest agricultural indus-
tries, dedicated ﬁrst to chicken and pork production and
subsequently to the cultivation of olives and wine grapes. All
are highly capital-intensive industries, organized as agribusi-
nesses. This land use transformation resulted from a series
of institutional changes that allowed the private use of
groundwater in the territory without which the intensive agri-
culture that currently dominates the drylands in the interior of
O’Higgins would be impossible. Agribusiness expansion, how-
ever, has been accompanied by water scarcity, the drying up of
many wells, and the exhaustion or reduction of groundwater
supplies, creating problems not only for the industry, but also
for local residents and small farmers. The local communities
opposed the installation of new agroindustrial plants and have
organized protests against the increasing scarcity of water via
an incipient civic movement (Mendoza & Ramı´rez, 2012;
Ramı´rez, Modrego, Mace´, & Ya´n˜ez, 2010).
The natural resource extraction and export-oriented agroin-
dustry characterizing these three territories are increasingly
common forms of investment in Latin America. Gudynas
(2013) understands these diﬀerent forms as “extractive” activ-
ities, 7 notwithstanding the obvious diﬀerences that exist
among them, such as the renewability of the “extracted”
resources or the scale of investment involved. More important
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tion of large-scale monocrops, however, is the diﬀerence
between the types of productive structures that these activities
foster in rural territories: cluster structures or enclave struc-
tures. While the former create a certain degree of economic
inclusion for local actors and companies, in the latter, the
degree of exclusion of the local population is much more sig-
niﬁcant. 8 While social resistance to the initial entry of these
actors into territories has been more widely studied in recent
years (e.g., Bebbington, 2012; Bury & Kolﬀ, 2002; Latorre &
Farrell, 2013), in this paper we examined the changes that
might be expected in environmental institutions once such
extra-territorial actors become established. We are especially
interested in the factors that enable or complicate the emer-
gence of environmental protection institutions under such con-
ditions, and the contrasting experiences of our three cases
allow us to explore this theme. In Chiloe´, there was an envi-
ronmental crisis followed by a signiﬁcant adjustment in insti-
tutions of environmental protection. Meanwhile, the
organization of the territory’s productive structure in a “clus-
ter” involving hundreds of small and mid-size providers of
goods and services inhibited the formation of powerful local
social movements that might call for new institutions to safe-
guard the environment. The contrast with Tarija is signiﬁcant.
In the latter territory, while there have been environmental
impacts, there has not yet been a crisis – however, the
“enclave”-type productive structure of gas production and
the threat to the territorial control of a group of actors
excluded from the activity (Guaranı´ communities), together
facilitated the emergence of a locally based socio-environmen-
tal mobilization that led to the modiﬁcation of environmental
regulations before a crisis erupted. The case of O’Higgins con-
ﬁrms the importance of the two aforementioned factors (crisis
and mobilization) for the emergence of new environmental
protection institutions. In that territory (unlike Chiloe´), there
is only incipient environmental crisis and no locally based
social movements have emerged (unlike Tarija). In O’Higgins,
therefore, reforms to existing environmental institutions have
not yet emerged, despite the serious state of underground
water resources.
The three cases therefore help illustrate two factors that
have driven the emergence of institutions for environmental
protection institutions: ecological crisis and the collective
action of social movements. The three cases, of course, do
not exhaust the array of possible situations, nor do they illus-
trate the varied circumstances that facilitate or inhibit the
emergence of the two factors. They also do not allow one to
make generalizations that are applicable in all situations.
Nevertheless, they oﬀer useful explanations for interpreting
the huge diﬃculty that exists in improving systems of environ-
mental protection in rural territories of Latin America that are
dominated by the presence of powerful extraterritorial compa-
nies.
Comparing these three cases is also interesting in that the
Bolivian and Chilean states diﬀer greatly in their degree of
“statehood”—their ability to eﬀectively exercise authority over
territory and enforce the laws they issue (see the discussion of
“statehood” [estatalidad] in Latin America in Altman & Luna,
2012). Over the last decade they have also diﬀered signiﬁcantly
in their political orientation. Thus Bolivia is typically charac-
terized as a weak state which, since 2006 has been explicitly
critical of neoliberalism, while Chile has had a stable and
strong bureaucracy and has embraced market reform and
private enterprise for several decades. While regulations for
environmental protection are, of course, not promoted only
by the state, they do typically require states with strongoversight capabilities. Comparative analysis of the three cases
in diﬀerent contexts of statehood shows that constraints in
environmental protection institutions are relatively indepen-
dent of the state’s historical organizational and enforcement
capabilities and ideological orientation. Rather, as we will
see, environmental protection institutions depend much more
on interests, on the coalitions in which they participate, and on
the states’ economic concerns.3. ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
We deﬁne environmental institutions as a set of rules, poli-
cies, procedures, practices, and norms that govern ownership
of, access to and use of a territory’s environmental assets
(see North, 1991). For this study, it is crucial to distinguish
between institutions that regulate access to environmental
assets (the opportunity to use something and rules governing
ownership of lands, forests or water, and other forms of
authorization to beneﬁt from things) and the institutions that
regulate the management of environmental assets (the capacity
to determine the way in which something is used, which
includes the rules governing decisions about the technology
to be used and modes of oversight and administration). Both
are environmental institutions, as they determine the rules gov-
erning the relationship between a territory’s social actors and
its environmental assets. 9
The classic formulation by Ribot and Peluso (2003) diﬀeren-
tiates between access and ownership. While the latter refers to
a right, access can include many other forms of beneﬁt from a
good. The concept of “access” is more useful than the concept
of “property,” because it is better applied to cases of resources
in which the state grants rights to private parties by means of
“concessions.” A concession has some attributes of “prop-
erty,” but not all; for example, it does not imply the possibility
of bequeathing access rights to heirs, and is typically time con-
strained, even if sometimes renewable. We will take up the
term access used by Ribot and Peluso (2003), because the cases
analyzed here represent forms of authorization to beneﬁt from
the use of something (natural gas, fjord water, underground
aquifers), which do not imply ownership of that thing. The
Bolivian state is still the owner of the hydrocarbons and the
Chilean state of the groundwater or coastal areas. Access with-
out ownership is granted to corporations or individuals that
meet certain requirements deﬁned by the owner.
Nevertheless, we believe it is necessary to emphasize man-
agement as a third area of environmental regulation. In legal
terms, the distinction between the right to use or manage a
good and other rights related to ownership, such as alienation,
transfer or bequest, or taking advantage of its beneﬁts is well
known (Honore´, 1961). In the case of environmental institu-
tions, the distinction is crucial, because in nearly all systems
for regulating natural resources, there are restrictions on
“unlimited availability.” These constraints are justiﬁed by
the eﬀects that the use of a natural resource has on other nat-
ural resources or on ecological relationships, of which that
resource is a part. The beneﬁts stemming from access to natu-
ral assets therefore can only be gained by respecting certain
guidelines for use that do not jeopardize the rights of another
individual or the integrity of other natural resources. The way
in which environmental assets are used is therefore subject to
additional rules that are diﬀerent from the rules for access and
ownership. We group these additional rules under the concept
of management institutions.
With that distinction in mind, we can highlight four dimen-
sions of change in environmental regulations. First, the three
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tain natural resources in territories is crucial. 10 The new reg-
ulations governing access typically resulted from an agreement
between the state and powerful extraterritorial actors, replac-
ing not only previous regulations for access, but also informal
institutions governed by local actors (as in the case of small-
scale ﬁshermen in Chiloe´ and their access to and use of the
coastal area). The new regulations for access always required
a change in national legal frameworks (see Table 1).
Second, the rules for management of environmental assets,
including technology, forms of administration, standards for
evaluation of impacts, etc., in the three cases took the form
of corporate self-regulation and some government monitoring
regulations that were not or could not be implemented. 11 In
Chile, these rules for free determination of forms of manage-
ment are much more explicit and formal: it was assumed that
private owners would have an interest in the rational and care-
ful use of water, rather than its overuse, and that the private
salmon corporations would safeguard the coastal area on
which their business depends. Accordingly, it was assumed
that the companies could therefore be regulated through inter-
nal codes of conduct and, basically, by the rule of their own
economic interests. Alternatively, in the case of Bolivia, the
state was seen as incapable of providing or unwilling to pro-
vide rigorous and systematic monitoring of corporations’ envi-
ronmental management.
Third, it is important to note that the initial institutions for
access and environmental management were the result of
agreements and a convergence of interests between large extra-
territorial actors (private corporations) and the respective
national government. These initial institutions were estab-
lished without any participation of local actors, who often
were not even informed of the new rules.
Finally, the initial systems of environmental regulation were
originally conceived to achieve non-environmental goals, par-
ticularly economic growth. The institutions therefore regulate
access to resources, but not environmental management per se,
which is left to the “good will” or “self-regulation” of the
direct beneﬁciary of that access.
As noted above, in only two of the three cases was there a
second phase of institutional changes aimed at reducing envi-
ronmental impact. In the following sections, we show that a
readjustment of the initial environmental institutions is possi-
ble, but we also suggest that the probabilities are highly depen-
dent on certain political, social, and environmental processes.
We identify two main factors that explain such institutional
readjustment: structural pressure leading to an environmental
crisis and collective social action.4. PATHWAYS OF CHANGE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS
Comparison of the three cases indicates that structural pres-
sures leading to an environmental crisis and the collectiveTable 1. Initial insti
Territory Institutional change
Tarija Privatization of gas deposits
Change in distribution of gas revenues
Chiloe´ Privatization of use of coastal area (1980 and 1990)
O’Higgins Privatization of groundwater
Source: Anthias (2012), Mendoza and Ramı´rez (2012), Nussbaum et al. (2012action of social mobilization are two distinct, albeit related,
dimensions of the pathways through which environmental reg-
ulations can change. The distinction is not perfect, of course.
All collective action by social movements needs structural con-
ditions to emerge, and all structures are reproduced by means
of people’s action. Both dimensions are embedded in social life
and in processes of historical change. Our study suggests, how-
ever, that the distinction is helpful because it draws attention
to the fact that in one of our cases (Tarija) dominant actors
were forced to change environmental regulations because of
pressure from other actors who mobilized, while in the other
cases (Chiloe´ and O’Higgins), pressure for change came only
from the eﬀects of environmental crisis itself and even then
the resource users did not respond by modifying environmen-
tal institutions, though the central state ultimately did.
(a) Environmental crisis and institutional change: Chiloe and
O’Higgins
A ﬁrst dimension to pathways of change in environmental
institutions detected in our cases stems from structural pres-
sures that “force” institutional change, sometimes even against
the will of the resource users themselves. When we say that
structures function outside the will of actors, we do not mean
that social structures are external to human beings. It is always
speciﬁc (individual or collective) actors who reproduce, rein-
vent, and sometimes beneﬁt from structures through their
day-to-day actions. 12 What often occurs, however, is that
the logic of their everyday action, especially their cumulative
eﬀect, goes beyond the intentions of the agents who realize
them, including powerful ones.
This structural pressure was particularly apparent in Chiloe
and O’Higgins. In Chiloe´, the highly intensive salmon aqua-
culture model led to a sanitary crisis that resulted in a dra-
matic loss of productive capacity and a drastic decrease in
exports during three years, with losses of billions of dollars
for the local population, the industry, and the country. In
the drylands of O’Higgins, aquifers were overused to such
an extent that the environmental authority stopped granting
permits for new wells. Without water for irrigation, the inten-
sive production of export crops is impossible in that part of the
country. In each of these cases, this structural pressure takes
the form of a paradox: the actors involved, local or extraterri-
torial, end up destroying natural resources even though they
do not want to and it is not in their interest to do so. In Tarija,
in contrast, while there has been incremental impact on water
and land-cover, there has been no shock and anyway an envi-
ronmental crisis or large-scale destruction of surface ecosys-
tems would not jeopardize gas production. Here we discuss
the Chiloe and O’Higgins cases.
The aquaculture boom in Chiloe´ was enabled by an institu-
tional model established in the ten years following the creation
of the Fishing and Aquaculture Law (1991) and based on the
principle of self-regulation. In this self-regulated model, multi-
national companies decide on their own to develop a series oftutional changes
Formal institution aﬀected
Hydrocarbons Law No. 3058 (1980, reform 2005)
General Fishing and Aquaculture Law No 18.892 (1980, reform 1991)
Executive Decree (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley) No 1.122 (1981)
). Compiled by authors.
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norms and rules imposed by the governments of countries
where they set up operations, which could aﬀect their compet-
itiveness (Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011). In response to pres-
sure from international markets, the companies also
established agreements on clean production and environmen-
tal best practices. The ISA crisis shook the foundations of this
scheme, which at one point had sparked criticism—quickly
brushed oﬀ—from organizations of small-scale ﬁshermen,
NGOs, and some academics (Ramı´rez et al., 2009).
The ISA crisis triggered a process in which voices that had
been ignored years before were now heard and partly taken
into account. In early 2008, a working group, originally
intended to create incentives to double production by 2015,
turned into a sort of “crisis committee” to salvage salmon
aquaculture. The working group, whose members were
appointed by the Ministry of Economy, formally consisted
only of public oﬃcials. The executive secretary of the working
group created a task force of professionals who were to con-
duct assessments and propose regulatory and legal measures
to support the industry during the crisis, as well as develop
guidelines for promoting increased production. The only aca-
demic invited to participate in the working group was a
researcher well known for his work with algae, who, despite
his lack of knowledge of salmon farming, was invited because
he served as an environmental adviser to the Ministry of Econ-
omy at the time.
This group initially deﬁned several contingency measures,
but quickly realized the gravity of the situation and the possi-
bility that companies might go bankrupt, increasing unem-
ployment. In response, the decision was taken to support the
industry more radically, on the grounds that regulatory
changes were not enough, and that the 1991 law also needed
to be changed. The private banking sector said that to con-
tinue lending to the industry, it would no longer accept the ﬁsh
themselves as suﬃcient guarantee, and that less risky assets
were needed. The proposed legislation therefore focused on
allowing the aquaculture concessions themselves (which had
been granted to companies by the state) to serve as loan guar-
antees, as well as on facilitating the transfer of concessions so
that they could be physically grouped together in order to bet-
ter organize sanitation management.
The draft legislation was submitted to Parliament in January
2009, and the ensuing public debate expanded its focus some-
what. The debate continued for ﬁfteen months and the law
was ﬁnally approved in April 2010. The debate organized by
the Senate was attended by local and national organizations
of ﬁshermen, environmental NGOs, associations of producers
of other marine resources, representatives of salmon and ser-
vice industries, and others groups. In that debate, which intro-
duced about 200 amendments, NGOs introducedmodiﬁcations
related to safeguards for protected areas, cancellation of per-
mits because of inadequate environmental conditions, and pen-
alties for ﬁsh escapes.Workers’ organizations, meanwhile, tried
to introduce the cancellation of concessions for anti-labor prac-
tices, but only managed, with support from the Ministry of
Labor, to win the inclusion of sanctions for those practices
and a temporary article to strengthen training and labor devel-
opment for workers in the aquaculture industry.
Despite these modiﬁcations, the overall emphasis of the
reform of the Fishing and Aquaculture Law of 1991 continued
to be on providing economic incentives, loan assistance, and
facilities for the commercial negotiation of concessions. Only
secondarily did the reform address environmental and sanita-
tion issues. The main environmental provisions introduced
were penalties for ﬁsh escapes, limitations on ﬁsh density,severe penalties for non-compliance with environmental
parameters for aquaculture in lakes, and the suspension of
new permits for aquaculture in lakes. Above all, the measures
strengthened SERNAPESCA, increasing its budget allocations
for 2010 and 2011. Although a signiﬁcant step forward, that
was not enough to oﬀset problems in the regulatory agency
caused by a long-standing lack of funding and staﬀ (see foot-
note 13).
The experience in Chiloe´ is revealing. Pressure from the san-
itation crisis led to an institutional change that while mainly
designed to solve the companies’ ﬁnancial problems also had
to do something to avoid similar crises in the future. A polit-
ical opportunity was therefore created for actors other than
those from the dominant coalition to introduce their views
and demands. The result was new legislation that reinforced
certain environmental management regulations, even if the
new rules remained inadequate in the view of many of the
actors who had promoted them.
Interpreting this experience through the lens of ecological
Marxism (see O’Connor, 2001), the paradox noted earlier
occurs because of the cumulative consequences of a structural
contradiction between the economic-technological model of
production and the ecosystems that sustain it. In other words,
the internal logic of capitalism is incompatible with the ecosys-
tems that sustain human life. While models of “rational
action” (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) help understand why
resource users in Chiloe (the salmon companies) were unable
to act collectively to address problems of ﬁsh and water health,
they pay much less attention to the “structures” (Bourdieu,
2005) that condition, constrain or, in some cases, even deter-
mine actors’ preferences as they interact with each other and
the environment. Theories of ecological Marxism account
for these structures.
An ecological-Marxist conception also helps understand the
self-destructive tendencies of extraterritorial corporations in
the case of water over-use in O’Higgins. In the controversy
over water scarcity, the General Water Oﬃce (Direccio´n Gen-
eral de Aguas) maintained that there was no real physical scar-
city of groundwater, just an excessive granting of concessions,
which the beneﬁciaries had not been able to use eﬀectively. As
of 2000, the DGA was so unconcerned that it had no studies of
aquifer availability and granted all requests for rights to water.
It was not until 2003, when demand for water rights became
problematic, that studies were conducted to measure actual
groundwater availability. After that, a ﬁnal quantity of rights
to be distributed was deﬁned, and concessions for new water
sources in the territory were closed. Chilean government agen-
cies responsible for resource management expect that the clos-
ing of water concessions will increase their price, encouraging
more investment in technology and more careful use of water
(Mendoza & Ramı´rez, 2012, pp. 103–110).
This reﬂects the conviction that awareness of the problems
of resource exhaustion is real. It also indicates that changes
seem to occur after an environmental crisis and that, as in
Chiloe, this response was ultimately led by the state, not the
resource users themselves. Furthermore, as in Chiloe´, corpo-
rate actors only act (or acquiesce to new institutions of envi-
ronmental regulation) once the crisis has aﬀected their own
businesses. When the impacts do not directly aﬀect the extra-
territorial corporation’s production conditions, those who are
aﬀected are left to take care of these impacts themselves, at
best receiving “compensation”. When the crisis occurs, the
dominant coalition does everything possible to solve the prob-
lems that are speciﬁc to its own economic needs, but does not
necessarily question the management of the territory or eco-
system.
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Tarija
A second pathway through which institutions that regulate
the access to and the use of a territory’s environmental assets
change, involves collective action, i.e., the initiative of either
the dominant coalition or other social groups that pressure
that coalition from outside. Unlike the ﬁrst path, in which
actors are forced to act because of the eﬀects of a crisis on
the continuity of the economic dynamic, here the actors decide
to act before or even in the absence of such a crisis. How and
why does this occur? What conditions lead to such a proactive
intervention?
In the case of the Assembly of the Guaranı´ People of Itika
Guasu (Asamblea del Pueblo Guaranı´ Itika Guasu, APGIG),
based in Entre Rı´os (Tarija), we have an important example
of collective action in the absence of an environmental crisis.
Anthias (2012, p. 71) notes that around 2003 the APGIG began
to complain to the state and to Repsol about the social and
environmental impacts of natural gas extraction “in the context
of a broader campaign for the recognition of their rights by the
company [. . . and] it denounced the lack of prior consultation
and demanded recognition of its ownership rights to the Com-
munity Land of Origin (Tierra Comunitaria de Origen, TCO)
and easement payments for the land occupied by the company
[. . .]. Amid this conﬂict, which lasted approximately eight years
(2003–10) [. . .], the APGIG began to take steps to measure and
monitor the environmental impact of hydrocarbons, with sup-
port from the NGOs CERDET and CEADESC. In 2003, a
monitoring team was formed to inspect the wells and camps
[. . .]. In December 2010, the APGIG and Repsol signed a
“Friendship Agreement” (“Acuerdo de Amistad” or formally
the Community Relations Agreement or Acuerdo de Relacio-
namiento Comunitario) which included payment of US $ 14.8
million to the APGIG for an investment fund. Other key points
are the establishment of an environmental audit [. . .] and for-
mal recognition by Repsol of the rights of the Guaranı´, includ-
ing consultation and their ownership rights to the TCO” (see
also Humphreys Bebbington, 2013).
The indigenous organization, with the aid of local and inter-
national NGOs, was able to force the creation of new environ-
mental regulatory institutions: an independent audit every ﬁve
years, a local development fund, and a system for ongoing
monitoring of the company’s activities. It is important to clar-
ify that the Bolivian government and several regional actors in
Tarija questioned the Friendship Agreement, because it
implied recognition of the Guaranı´ organizations’ territorial
authority and, in their opinion, implicitly questioned the
Bolivian state’s authority to assume the task of representing
and protecting its citizens. In practice, however, none of them
have formally rejected its existence (Anthias, 2012, pp. 70–80).
The Bolivian state has not, however, recognized other of the
Guaranı´s’ demands and the relationship between APGIG
and the government continues to be conﬂictive, with APGIG’s
perception being that the state does not represent the organi-
zation’s interests, but is mainly driven by the demands of an
economy based on gas extraction (Anthias, 2012, pp. 76–77).
Indeed, as in the case of Chiloe´ after the crisis, the new insti-
tutions created in Itika Guasu did not question the rules gov-
erning access to environmental assets by extraterritorial
corporations. On the contrary, they ratiﬁed them by granting
them a certain social legitimacy that complements the corpora-
tions’ legal rights. Nevertheless, they do imply a change in the
rules for managing those assets by questioning both the virtual
self-regulation of the gas company and the (theoretical)
monopoly on regulation by the central state of Bolivia.There continues to be controversy over the possible eﬀects
of the monitoring system anticipated in the Friendship Agree-
ment. Some believe it is a simple way of co-opting the APGIG,
which would abandon its critical stance in exchange for mon-
etary compensation. Others question the legitimacy of extra-
oﬃcial monitoring, while still others say that a more precise
assessment of its eﬀects will only be possible after these insti-
tutions have been in place for a longer time (Castro &
Cortez, 2011; Cortez, 2011). These almost irreconcilable view-
points notwithstanding, the new institutions that emerged
from the Guaranı´ peoples’ collective action give reason to
think that it may at least be possible to combine the environ-
mental priorities of extraterritorial actors with those of at least
one of the relevant local actors. Sustainability is not guaran-
teed, but there are more propitious social-political conditions
for achieving it.
Repsol’s operation in Tarija is conditioned not only by the
collective action of the Guaranı´, but also by another form of
mobilization, this time located in Europe. Interviewee
accounts noted that the company has its own environmental
management standards over and above those required by the
Bolivian state. Why? The following quotes illustrate the rea-
soning of the contractors and company oﬃcials:
Repsol is in twenty countries. All it needs is one accident, one accident
with the operator. So more than anything, it is the company itself that
said no, “We have our standards here, we have to comply with the law,
because often the government may be corrupt or it may not care, but
the company has to keep operating.”
[Cited in Anthias, 2012, p. 63]
That’s how policies of respect for culture and biodiversity begin, poli-
cies for relations with indigenous communities. Just thinking about
shareholders isn’t sustainable. There will come a time when other inter-
est groups, who are also your stakeholders, will throw you out. So the
approach changed. We’re talking about the past 10 years, when these
internal rules began to evolve. Environmental issues arose ﬁrst, and
now social issues.
[Cited in Castro & Cortez, 2011, p. 20]
Repsol’s environmental management rules were therefore
implemented because of the social and political pressure of
NGOs and public opinion in Europe, and the collective eﬀorts
of diﬀerent actors on local and international actors. There has
been no such international pressure on the salmon companies
in Chiloe´ nor among the consumers of farm products from
O’Higgins. Moreover, organizations of artisanal ﬁshermen in
Chiloe´ and of small-scale producers in O’Higgins had none
of the experience of struggle for territory nor of international
support networks that the Guaranı´ people had. The greater
prior organizational weakness and greater political isolation
of local Chilean organizations conspired against possibilities
for collective action once the extraterritorial companies were
established in their territories.
Theories of social movements and collective action help
account for both the presence and absence of collective social
action in the three cases. First, since the 1980s, the socio-polit-
ical context in Bolivia had been more open to and conducive
of social mobilization than had been the case in Chile, creating
a political opportunity structure facilitating the emergence of
collective action over a longer period. In addition, the interna-
tional “opportunity structure” regarding environmental prob-
lems related to hydrocarbon activities and the rights of
indigenous peoples facilitated eﬀective Guarani mobilization.
While the opportunity structure dimension worked in Tarija’s
favor, it was much more adverse in the cases of Chiloe´ and
O’Higgins, where there is no international movement for mon-
itoring agribusinesses or salmon-farming companies. Second,
“mobilizing structures” – the formal organizations, networks,
EXTRATERRITORIAL INVESTMENTS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA 39forms of leadership, and places in which broader ties of group
solidarity can be created (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1983; Tilly,
1978) – were more supportive in Tarija. Chiloe´’s small-scale
ﬁshermen and O’Higgins’s small, independent farmers had
none of the external and international connections enjoyed
by the Guaranı´. Third, “frames” of indigeneity and territory
in Tarija served as far more powerful mobilizing devices than
any sets of meanings or concepts through which actors in
Chile could understand, give meaning to and mobilize around
their situation (Dubet, 1989; Moore, 1978; Smelser, 1963;
Touraine, 1978).
Possibilities of collective mobilization around environmen-
tal institutions were also aﬀected by diﬀerences in structures
of production across the three cases. With the existence of
an economic cluster structure in Chiloe´, in which more than
500 local service companies are linked to the ﬁfteen salmon
farming companies, and thousands of workers depend directly
or indirectly on the industry, the range of actors who consider
themselves beneﬁciaries of the activities that drive the territo-
rial dynamic tends to expand. In the case of O’Higgins, a sig-
niﬁcant number of local fruit and vegetable farmers and day
laborers, as well as groups of women and young people who
are employed in modern agribusinesses, became beneﬁciaries
(smaller scale, but beneﬁciaries nonetheless) of an economic
dynamic that depended on overusing groundwater in the terri-
tory. In Tarija, although the dominant economic activity cre-
ates an enclave structure, the distribution of royalties to the
local government also tends to allow the pool of potential ben-
eﬁciaries to increase through expansion of public employment
and infrastructure. It is not surprising, therefore, that the main
opponents of gas extraction are precisely those actors who
potentially receive its worst negative eﬀects and who are far
from the areas that receive these ﬁscal beneﬁts. In their terri-
tory, the Guaranı´ peoples receive the largest part of the poten-
tial impacts, and because of their distance from towns, have
far more limited access to public sector employment or the
positive eﬀects of public works and public services ﬁnanced
by gas rents.
Nevertheless, the idea of a simple transaction between distri-
bution and environmental protection must be nuanced. It is
important to remember that environmental conﬂicts do not
occur in isolation. Although the Guaranı´ people’s acceptance
of compensation might be interpreted as a transaction in
which complaints about environmental impacts are traded in
return for money, it can also be seen as the outcome of mobi-
lization for demands that had both environmental and distrib-
utive dimensions but which were made under conditions of
asymmetries of power. Indeed, an apparent trade-oﬀ may, in
fact, be no more than the unintentional result of a negotiation
conducted in contexts that were socially and politically disad-
vantageous for the Guarani. Environmental demands should
not be understood simply as an excuse or a facade for eco-
nomic grievances, just because they are sometimes indistin-
guishable from one another.
Above all, it is important to remember that for the Guaranı´,
the presence of the gas company constitutes a threat to recog-
nition of the territorial rights for which they had been ﬁghting
for years before Repsol began its operations (Anthias &
Radcliﬀe, 2013; Humphreys Bebbington, 2010, 2013). We
can therefore conclude that collective action is much more
likely when local actors feel or see a threat to their rights to
access environmental assets of which they consider themselves
owners, beneﬁciaries or caretakers. When that does not occur,
the conﬂicts are less intense. In Chiloe´, when the salmon com-
panies arrived, small-scale ﬁsherfolk suﬀered inconveniences
and restrictions, but they managed to avoid major obstaclesto exercising their right to coastal ﬁshing. Although they
had grievances, these did not lead to prolonged conﬂict.
Indeed, during the institutional adjustment of the salmon
industry after the ISA crisis, small-scale ﬁsherfolk managed to
secure greater protection for their traditional ﬁshing grounds.
At ﬁrst glance, it could be assumed that local actors are
more concerned about the environment because their subsis-
tence and livelihoods depend on more components of the ter-
ritory’s environmental assets than do those of extraterritorial
actors, which normally take advantage of more delimited
and speciﬁc resources. The cases analyzed do not conﬁrm that
assumption. In Chiloe´, O’Higgins and Tarija, the relevant
local actors do not show greater environmental concern than
the extraterritorial stakeholders. Nevertheless, the Guaranı´
case suggests that when new institutions question or threaten
the rules for local actors’ access to environmental assets, then
conﬂicts and collective action may arise more easily. If, in
addition, the group’s cultural and historical identity is associ-
ated with the territory and its ecosystems, its consideration of
environmental issues is likely to include more components of
the environmental assets than those whose relationship with
the territory is purely one of economic use. These two condi-
tions, which we group in the “framing processes” of collective
action, help explain higher levels of collective action under-
taken by indigenous groups in various conﬂicts in Latin
America in order to improve environmental regulation of
extraterritorial corporations.5. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND TYPES OF
INSTITUTIONS
Based on the three cases, we can also indicate which institu-
tional changes occur with regard to what type of institutions
and why, ultimately, it is so diﬃcult to bring about changes
in environmental institutions. We have already noted that
extraterritorial actors seek changes in the rules for manage-
ment of environmental assets that generally do not question
or constrain the rules for access to those resources. Solutions
to the crisis sometimes even consist of deepening the very rules
for access that, because of market rights, facilitated the extra-
territorial corporations’ entry into the business in the territory.
Some elements of institutional change in Chiloe´ could be
considered “paradigmatic,” because they partly question self-
regulation by corporations and improve conditions for state
oversight of the sector (increase in budget and areas of respon-
sibility of the state agency responsible for sanitary controls,
etc.). Some actors, however, especially academics and environ-
mentalists, although they do not dismiss the progress that has
been made, see this basically as an “adjustment” to the regu-
latory system, because it does not consider all regulations that
would be necessary to protect all coastal ecosystems. More-
over, the process of discussion and creation of new regulations
shows that environmental management per se is not the main
concern of either the industry or the government. The priority
is the need to ensure the ﬁnancial viability of the industry in
crisis, through systems of guarantees and the transfer of rights
among private entities to solve the problem of bank debt. Even
so, the diﬀerent coalitions that were formed in the process of
parliamentary discussion demonstrate that, after the environ-
mental crisis, space was created in which other actors with var-
ious alliances could push for institutional changes that were
broader in scope and ambition. 13 With the environmental cri-
sis, the position of the extraterritorial companies lost credibil-
ity, and the position of those who had criticized existing
regulations in the past gained ground; as a result, new actors
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(Nussbaum et al., 2012).
Cases in which there was no change before an environmen-
tal crisis, as in O’Higgins, also seem to indicate that if this
institutional change occurs, it is likely to focus on technologi-
cal modiﬁcations that do not aﬀect the rules of access to key
resources, or which even reinforce the market mechanisms that
gave rise to the over-exploitation of the aquifers. This was
indicated by a top government oﬃcial:
“Since this water scarcity, now there will be people who are going to
have the right and others who are going to have to acquire it somehow,
no longer through a request for a permit, but through some transac-
tion, perhaps even by friendship, someone may be able to oﬀer part
of their rights, it’s going to be informal. But it’s logical that this will
be traded in the market, period.”
[Cited in Mendoza & Ramı´rez, 2012, p. 115]
Finally, the case of Tarija conﬁrms that even when there is a
group of actors who, like the Guaranı´, are outside of the dom-
inant coalition, the existing power asymmetry also tends to
result in what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) call “institutional
changes by layering” – in this case the superimposition of rules
for local monitoring of hydrocarbon extraction on top of rules
allowing for state oversight. In practice, under the conditions
of asymmetrical power relations studied here, the rules of
access to the territory’s environmental assets are much more
diﬃcult to change, in that they constitute the source of security
and conﬁdence that enables extraterritorial actors to make and
expand their investments.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed three cases of rural territories
in which powerful extraterritorial actors invested in extractive
enterprises (sensu Gudynas, 2012, 2013) based on diﬀerent
types of natural resources. The new territorial economic
dynamics triggered by these investments became possible once
new institutions were created that gave extra-territorial actors
secure access to key natural resources. These institutions were
not, however, designed to regulate management of those
resources, a role that was instead left to self-regulation by
the actor that beneﬁted from that access. In general, the new
institutional arrangements were the result of agreements
between actors within the dominant coalitions, namely power-
ful extraterritorial actors (private corporations) and the
respective central state. Local actors played a minor role.
We identiﬁed two distinct dimensions to the pathways
through which change in environmental institutions can occur
subsequent to this initial conferral of access rights. In none of
our three cases did extraterritorial companies or the state
address environmental issues proactively. Instead, they
addressed them only in response to ecological crises and/or
collective social action. Achieving collective action before cri-
ses occur is diﬃcult, because it requires a rare and diﬃcult
combination of factors: local groups must (i) be situated in a
context of favorable opportunities, (ii) have organizational
structures powerful enough to inﬂuence extraterritorial corpo-
rations, and (iii) perceive more risks than beneﬁts in the terri-
torial dynamic guided by those corporations.
In the three cases analyzed, a ﬁrst pathway for changing the
environmental institutions occurs when the actors in the dom-
inant coalition are forced to change their behavior because of
environmental crisis. When the rules for access to and use of
the territory’s environmental assets are conducive to the
exhaustion of a natural resource that is crucial for the repro-
duction of the economic dynamic itself, the actors—even thosewith the power to avoid the crisis—tend to erode the natural
basis of their own activity. It is not in their medium- or
long-term interest to do so, and they often are fully aware of
the problem, but they still hew to a course of action that ends
up causing an environmental crisis or collapse. It is the struc-
ture of economic incentives and motivations that leads to such
crisis. Dominant extraterritorial actors are unwilling to change
the rules that allowed the dynamic to begin, since doing so
would imply substantial modiﬁcations both to their ability
to proﬁt from the use of natural resources as well as to the bal-
ance of power in the territory. The central state would lose
sources of national economic growth and of tax revenue; cor-
porations would see pressure on proﬁt margins.
A second pathway of change in environmental institutions
has been through collective social action within or outside of
the dominant coalition. This action forces consideration of
broader social interests or of diﬀerent dimensions of the terri-
tory’s environmental assets. For collective action to aﬀect the
underlying structure of environmental institutions in the terri-
tory, it must have a decisive inﬂuence on actors in the domi-
nant coalition, whether private corporations or the state.
The actors that decide to act must have extraterritorial social
allies and suﬃcient political or symbolic resources, including
coherent and credible discourses, to modify the behavior of
the dominant coalition. In general, these actors (perceive that
they) enjoy fewer economic and political beneﬁts from the ter-
ritorial dynamics linked to extractivism and (perceive that
they) are subject to greater harm.
In none of the cases studied did the change in environmental
institutions require that any actors in the dominant coalition
be excluded from it nor that new actors become part of that
coalition. The institutional change occurred when one or both
actors in the coalition that gave rise to the initial territorial
dynamic, either the central state or extraterritorial corpora-
tions, ceded ground as a result of structural pressure or pres-
sure from actors outside the dominant coalition. The process
of institutional change undoubtedly allows other actors to
inﬂuence political decision making, although this does not
mean that they modify the composition of the dominant coali-
tions in the territory.
The three cases under analysis conﬁrm that collective action
is generally diﬃcult to achieve and turns out to be strongly
dependent on the extent to which actors, including the state,
beneﬁt from the economic outcomes of territorial dynam-
ics—that is, from the way in which the dominant activity mod-
iﬁes and reconﬁgures the local productive structure. This
implies that when territorial actors are included in the beneﬁts
of territorial economic growth (whether through employment,
subcontracting, ﬁscal transfers or corporate responsibility),
they are less likely to act collectively to demand greater envi-
ronmental regulation. In our case studies, men and women
tend to minimize or dismiss environmental impacts in favor
of redistributive policies. In contrast, when they feel excluded,
and especially when their access to the territory’s environmen-
tal assets is under threat, their environmental concerns are
more likely to result in mobilization to demand a response.
This implies that, at least in these cases, economic growth
can create greater inequality or greater environmental risk,
but will not spark environment-related collective action as
long as it generates a certain degree of access to economic
opportunities.
In these cases, the central state institutions that regulate the
activities of extraterritorial actors also act as close allies of
those same actors and together with them form part of a dom-
inant coalition endorsing extractivism as a development path.
This coalition is not, however, immutable. First, the state itself
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dence in other rural territories (Cerdan & Policarpo, 2012)
that the state can act diﬀerently, instead encouraging collective
action by local groups supported by environmental organiza-
tions. In this scenario, state action could be decisive for bal-
ancing power in territories instead of tipping it furthertoward powerful extraterritorial actors. Nevertheless, the diﬃ-
culty of achieving such behavior on the part of the state repre-
sents an additional obstacle to the emergence of new and more
robust institutions for environmental regulation under condi-
tions in which powerful external actors conﬁgure the economic
dynamics of a rural territory.NOTES1. Extraterritorial actors are groups, corporations, or other types of
organizations that are not controlled by actors in the territories where they
operate, and which do not have identities based in those places.
2. The natural resources boom in Latin America has led to a growing
literature about extractivism and neo-extractivism (cfr. Bebbington, 2009;
Escobar, 2010; Gudynas, 2012, 2013).
3. It is important to note that whenever we refer to “collective action,”
we do so in the sense of schools of thought on and analysis of social
movements, not in the sense used by Ostrom (1990).
4. See Ramı´rez & Ruben, 2015; Hinojosa-Valencia et al., 2015.
5. The Territorial Dynamics Program’s publications can be found at:
www.rimisp.org.
6. Conversely, where the barriers to entry implied in the exploitation of
the local resource are not as high as in the cases mentioned, extraterritorial
actors coexist and compete with local stakeholders over control of the main
drivers of local economic development. Among the territories studied in
the RTD program, this is the situation that characterizes, for instance,
potato farming in Jauja (Peru), dairy production in Susa and Simijaca
(Colombia) and Santo Toma´s (Nicaragua: see Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2015),
and the creation of a tourism industry in Santa Catarina (Brazil).
7. According to Gudynas (2014, p. 80), “extractivism is deﬁned as a
particular case of natural resource extraction, characterized by extracting
resources in large volumes or through the use of high-intensity procedures,
with the resources being subsequently export oriented [. . .] as raw
materials or with minimal processing [. . .]. Extractivist activities
therefore include some mining and petroleum operations, but also
intensive monocropping agriculture (such as soy or some biofuel crops),
shrimp farming, etc.”
8. Agricultural activities such as large-scale monocropping of soy or corn
tend to function as enclaves, while systems of mining royalties for
municipalities tend to moderate the “enclave” eﬀect of these activities.9. The signiﬁcant existing bibliography on environmental governance is
relatively recent (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006) and has taken a basically
normative approach (De Castro, 2013). Nevertheless, studies that combine
this approach with political ecology and its emphasis on power
asymmetries are important, as we will see, for the approach taken in
this work (cfr. Bebbington, 2012).10. The central role that institutions play in access is also conﬁrmed by
analysis of the 20 case studies: all of the economic activities analyzed have
a strong material-natural basis and are related to the means of access to,
rather than the management of, the resources.11. In none of the cases does the state have the resources or the interest
to gather its own environmental information, much less to eﬀectively
control the technologies that are used or the type of intervention in the
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